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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
N.H.B., a minor. 
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KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION, 




PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following question is presented for review by 
Kearns-Tribune Corporation (hereinafter "Kearns-Tribune"), 
expressed in terms and circumstances of the case, but without 
unnecessary detail: 
Question: Did the Utah Court of Appeals err on 
constitutional grounds when it concluded that there is a 
presumption that all juvenile court proceedings are to be 
closed to the public and press? Furthermore, if the Court of 
Appeals did err, what standards should a juvenile court apply 
to determine if closure is warranted? Particularly, is closure 
constitutionally permissable where the findings and conclusions 
of the court are unsupported by evidence. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals may be found 
as No. 880109-CA of the records of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and as In re N.H.B., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
OF COURT 
This petition is brought before the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (1953) 
and 78-2-1(5) (1953) and Rule 42 et seq. of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. The decision sought to be reviewed was 
entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on February 22, 1989. 
There has been no order respecting a rehearing or granting an 
extension of time. 
STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The interpretation of the following constitutional 
provisions and statutes is determinative of this matter: 
Constitutional Provisions 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
-2-
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-33 (1953) 
Hearings in children's cases shall be held before 
the court without a jury and may be conducted in 
an informal manner. The general public shall be 
excluded and only such persons admitted, 
including persons whom the parents wish to be 
present, as have a direct interest in the case or 
in the work of the court; provided, however, that 
whenever the hearing is had on a written petition 
charging what would be a felony if committed by 
an adult, persons having a legitimate interest in 
the proceeding, including responsible 
representatives of public information media, may 
be admitted by the judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for Writ of Certiorari for the 
review of an opinion and decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
that affirmed the closing of a juvenile court proceeding to the 
press and public by the Second District Juvenile Court, Judge 
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Sharon P. McCully presiding, in In the Matter of N.H.B., a. 
minor. 
The proceeding closed was a hearing on a motion to 
recall jurisdiction to determine whether or not N.H.B., a 
person under the age of 18, was to be treated as an adult or a 
minor for alleged acts of N.H.B. that if committed by an adult 
would be felonies. Kearns-Tribune requests this Court to issue 
its writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to review 
that Order closing the recall proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
[Inasmuch as the hearing held below on January 7, 
1988/ is of ultimate importance in resolving the issues 
presented to this Court, a copy of the complete transcript of 
that hearing is included herein as Appendix "C" to this brief 
as a convenience to the Court. All references to the 
transcript (referred to hereinafter as "T.") refer to that 
transcript. Other references to the record are to the 
particular pleading or document of record inasmuch as the 
record has not been consecutively numbered by the Juvenile 
Court Clerk.] 
N.H.B. (the initials of the accused and the way that 
person was referred to in many of the juvenile proceedings 
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(N.H.B. stands for Nicholas H. Byrd)) was accused in Fifth 
Circuit Court (now Third Circuit Court) of aggravated 
kidnapping and attempted homicide for allegedly stabbing an 
F.B.I, agent. (T. 19; Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion 
to Recall Jurisdiction) N.H.B. was a minor, however. (T. 22) 
Consequently, N.H.B. asked the juvenile court to recall 
jurisdiction of him from the Fifth Circuit Court and, 
therefore, that he be handled in the juvenile court process. 
(T. 2) 1 
A hearing to determine whether or not the recall 
hearing should be closed to the press and public was held on 
January 7, 1988, immediately prior to the scheduled recall 
hearing. (T. 1-2)2 N.H.B. opposed the opening of the recall 
hearing. (T. 9-13) 
Kearns-Tribune, through its legal counsel, presented 
oral argument in support of its petition to intervene and in 
support of its motion to open proceedings. (T. 3-9, 20-21) 
1
 The minor was ultimately certified to be treated as an 
adult. (Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Recall 
Jurisdiction.) 
2
 The court entertained and granted the petition of 
Kearns-Tribune to intervene for the limited purpose of opposing any 
efforts to close any proceeding in this matter. (T. 26-27; 
Petition for Limited Intervention; Motion to Open Proceedings; 
Order) a copy of which is attached as Appendix HD") 
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N.H.B. offered oral argument in opposition to the motion to 
open proceedings but offered no evidence. (T. 9-13) The State 
of Utah did not resist the closing of the hearing and offered 
no evidence. (T. 14) 
There were no witnesses presented or any evidence 
taken or proffered at the hearing. (T. in its entirety) In 
particular, there was no evidence taken at the hearing upon 
which to conclude that: 
a) a fair trial for N.H.B. would likely be 
jeopardized by press and public attendance at the recall 
proceeding (T. in its entirety); or 
b) alternatives to closure would not adequately 
protect any rights of N.H.B. to a fair trial or protect any 
other substantial governmental interest (T. in its entirety); or 
c) any substantial governmental interest was at 
risk (T. in its entirety); or 
d) there was a compelling governmental interest 
necessitating the closure of the recall proceeding or that 
complete closure of the recall proceeding was necessary to 
protect the sensibilities of any person, including the accused 
minor (T. in its entirety); or 
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e) the physical or psychological well-being of 
any person would be affected by having an open preliminary 
hearing (T. in its entirety); or 
f) having an open recall hearing would in any 
way hinder or impede any potential rehabilitation of the 
accused. (T. in its entirety) 
After argument, Judge McCully ruled from the bench 
that the recall hearing would be closed to the press and 
public.3 (T. 21-14) The courtroom was cleared of all press 
and spectators and the recall hearing commenced. (T. 30) 
N.H.B. was ultimately certified through the recall proceeding 
to be handled in the adult criminal justice system. 
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Recall 
Jurisdiction, pp. 6-7.)3 
A few days after ruling from the bench, Judge McCully 
issued her Memorandum Decision on the Reams-Tribune1s Motion 
to Open Proceedings. (Memorandum Decision on Motion to Open 
Proceedings, a copy of which is attached as Appendix MBM.) No 
findings of fact were entered, however, on the record prior to 
J
 Judge McCully further ruled that the announcement of 
her decision based upon the recall hearing would be open to press 
and public. (T. 23) She reserved ruling on whether or not the 
oral arguments prior to issuing her order on the recall proceeding 
would be open to press and public. (T. 25-26) Those oral 
arguments were ultimately opened. 
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the closure of the recall proceeding nor were findings of fact 
ever entered in this matter. (T. in its entirety; R. in its 
entirety; Memorandum Decision on Motion to Open Proceedings; 
Order on Motion to Open Proceedings.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals heard this matter on appeal 
and, as applicable to this petition, held: 
1. "[A] presumption of openness in juvenile 
proceedings is not required under the first 
amendment of the United States Constitution." 
(Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 8.) 
2. M[U]nder Article I, Section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution, the people do not have a 
constitutional right of public access to juvenile 
court proceedings in Utah." (Opinion of Court of 
Appeals, p. 11.) 
3. The proponent of an open proceeding bears the 
burden of proof. (Opinion of Court of Appeals, 
p. 13.) 
4. Notwithstanding that no evidence was presented by 
any party, that "[t]he court's findings amply 
support the order that the proceedings be closed 
to the media.H (Opinion of Court of Appeals, 
pp. 2, 13-14.) 
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Based upon those holdings, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the Juvenile Court to close the proceedings. 
(Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 4.) 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENTS 
This petition for writ of certiorari is made to this 
court upon the following two grounds: 
1. The questions presented by this matter and 
decided by the Court of Appeals are so important and far 
reaching that they should be settled by this Court. 
2. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
constitutional law in a way that is in conflict with the spirit 
and meaning of other decisions of this Court made in analogous 
and related situations and, consequently, the resolution of 
that conflict should be made by this Court. See Rule 43; Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THIS MATTER, 
BEING OF GRAVE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND OF GENERAL 
APPLICATION TO ALL JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS, SHOULD BE 
RESOLVED BY THIS COURT. 
In petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, Kearns-Tribune asks this Court to 
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make its determination in a matter encompassing dearly-
important and deeply fundamental concepts of freedom, the 
foundation of which is anchored in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 15 of the 
Utah State Constitution. In particular, we ask that this court 
consider the breadth and extent of First Amendment and Utah 
State Constitutional privilege afforded to members of the 
public and press in the juvenile court process. The Utah Court 
of Appeals, we believe, did not adequately provide the proper 
deference to First Amendment rights and privileges in this 
matter. The Kearns-Tribune does not ask here nor did it ask 
the juvenile court or the Court of Appeals for an absolute 
right of access to juvenile court proceedings but only to a 
qualified right, founded upon a presumption of openness. 
Inasmuch as the decision rendered in this matter will 
impact the procedures of the juvenile court system in all other 
juvenile court matters, this Court should be the one to resolve 
what that impact should be. This Court assumes the 
responsibility for promulgating the procedural rules under 
which all the courts of this State operate. A decision of this 
court in this matter would compliment this Court's rule making 
authority and lower court supervisory responsibility. As such, 
also, this Court could assure a consistent growth in the law. 
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Additionally, if there is going to be an exception to 
established privileges of a fundamental nature, that exception 
should be established by the highest court of this state. 
There are no decisions of this Court or the United 
States Supreme Court which are directly on point. This Court 
and the United States Supreme Court, however, have consistently 
ruled that courts are rebuttably presumed open, only to be 
closed upon the showing, supported by evidence, of a compelling 
need to close. The burden of showing that need for closure has 
consistently been placed upon the party desiring closure. The 
Utah Court of Appeals, in affirming the juvenile court, 
reversed that presumption of openness and the burden of proof. 
That court, relying on decisions of supreme courts other than 
the United States Supreme Court or this Supreme Court, 
concluded that the juvenile court proceeding would be presumed 
closed and that Mthe people do not have a constitutional right 
of public access to juvenile court proceedings in Utah.M (In 
the Matter of N.H.B., No. 880109-CA.) As noted later in this 
petition, the rule applied in some jurisdictions provides for a 
presumption of openness while in others, a presumption of 
closure. This divergence of thought among the courts also 
suggests that the Utah high court should resolve the issue for 
Utah. 
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The decisions, however, of this Court and those of the 
United States Supreme Court in analogous and related situations 
suggest that this matter should be scrutinized carefully by 
this Court. Those cases where fundamental freedoms are 
involved, and where no definitive or substantial prior ruling 
has been made upon which lesser courts may be guided, are the 
prototype cases that should be resolved by this Court. Just as 
the United States Supreme Court has assumed special 
significance in the development of First Amendment law and has 
not left it to its federal court of appeals, this Court may 
appropriately assume the premier position in resolving First 
Amendment and state constitutional issues in its own court 
system. For these reasons, we believe that this Court's writ 
of certiorari should issue to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE DECISION 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS INCONSISTENT WITH DECISIONS OF 
UTAH SUPREME COURT AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN 
ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS. 
The courtrooms of this state and country, whether for 
civil or criminal matters, are traditionally and routinely left 
open for the press and public to view the administration of 
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justice at the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial level.4 The 
open courtroom has been thought to be a significant and 
important tenet of a free society with direct benefit to the 
judicial process.5 
4
 The United States Supreme Court has provided the 
historical and traditional background for open proceedings with 
extensive review of both American and English history. Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Chief Justice Burger 
traces the tradition of openness to the days before the Norman 
Conquest. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565. Kearns-Tribune 
does not rely on history, however, in asking this court to reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Just as a history of 
openness does not make openness constitutionally required, a 
history of closure does not make closure constitutionally 
required. The history of juvenile proceedings does not reveal a 
strong tradition of openness. At worst, however, juvenile courts 
have had inconsistent philosophies with regard to openness. Note, 
The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 
Mich. L. Rev. 1540 (1983). 
5
 In Gannett Co. v. DePasguale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court wrote: 
There can be no blinking the fact that there is a 
strong societal interest in public trials. 
Openness in court proceedings may improve the 
quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to 
come forward with relevant testimony, cause all 
trial participants to perform the duties more 
conscientiously, and generally give the public an 
opportunity to observe the judicial system. 
Also referring to an open trial, the Supreme Court in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), wrote 
that "secrecy is profoundly inimical to the trial process." Id. at 
595 (Brennin, J., concurring). 
(Footnote 5 continued next page) 
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Open courtrooms are clearly preferred in even those 
areas containing the most sensitive of matters. This Court has 
made it clear that court proceedings are presumptively open. 
Reams-Tribune Corporation v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984); 
KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981) (Creer); KUTV, 
Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983) (Easthope). That same 
constitutional presumption for criminal proceedings has been 
established by the United States Supreme Court.6 
Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Globe Newspaper 
(Footnote 5 cont'd) 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated that public 
access to judicial proceedings was "of vast importance" 
because of "the security which publicity gives for the 
proper administration of justice." Cowley v. Pulsifer, 
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884); Publisher Industries, Inc. v. 
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) 
See also, Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary 
of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D.C. Utah 1985). 
6 In his plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), Chief Justice Burger suggested 
extension of the right of access to civil trials when he wrote: 
Whether the public has a right to attend trials 
of civil cases is a question not raised by this 
case, but we note that historically both civil 
and criminal trials have been presumptively open. 
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Co, v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Consequently, the 
requirements established for the closing of hearings (including 
trials, pretrials and preliminary hearings) has been given 
constitutional significance. This Court established a 
procedure to close preliminary hearings in Kearns-Tribune 
Corporation v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984), that must be 
met in order to satisfy both federal and state constitutional 
requirements.7 A similar procedure for preliminary hearings 
was subsequently adopted in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 
478 U.S. 1 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise II"). The presumption has 
clearly been that court proceedings should be left open. 
In an analogous situation, the United States Supreme 
Court and, only recently, this Court have ruled on the standard 
for closing a hearing to protect the sensibilities of juvenile 
witnesses. In Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 
(1982), the court found that even desires to protect juvenile 
victims of sex offenses did not warrant an automatic closure of 
the hearing. The same result occurred in State v. Crowley, 766 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court based its decision on both the 
United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution, each 
which were independently sufficient to support its ruling. Artie 
I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution provides: "No law 
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or o 
the press." 
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P.2d 1069 (Utah 1988), where a conviction was overturned 
because the court automatically closed a hearing to protect a 
fifteen year old witness. In both cases, a presumption of 
closure was found to be constitutionally defective. 
This matter, however, brings before this Court the 
question of to what extent First Amendment rights apply in 
juvenile courts, new territory in this state. The juvenile 
court is just that, "a court." Important matters are handled 
there that could be of interest and significance to the public 
at large. The context of this case is demonstrative. Here, 
simply because the juvenile was slightly short of majority age, 
the public is totally precluded for no supported reason from 
examining the process and facts by which a minor was 
adjudicated as capable of being treated as an adult for 
charging and trial. There is nothing in the public domain by 
which the public can evaluate why this teenager, accused of 
severely stabbing an FBI agent and kidnapping, should be tried 
as an adult while some other unknown knife-wielding teenager is 
not. The public ought to be able to observe what goes into its 
juvenile system and not be compelled to labor under blind faith 
that it works. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has established a procedure 
diametrically opposed to the standards established in the 
similar contexts noted above. In particular, that court has 
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concluded that there is no constitutional right or privilege 
for public access to juvenile court proceedings in Utah, As 
such, that court further went on to conclude that even though 
the hearing may be opened by the juvenile court judge, that in 
doing so the party requesting that the hearing be open have the 
burden of going forward with evidence and proving reasons that 
it remain open. No standards for opening the proceeding were 
suggested, however. The court provided that the "proponent of 
the motion to open the proceeding, Kearns-Tribune, bore the 
burden of proof and cannot now complain because it failed to 
offer evidence sufficient to persuade the court." Yet, 
clearly, the press or public would not have any information to 
present by way of testimony where it had no way of knowing even 
who the juvenile was. 
The Court of Appeals has placed a burden on the press 
and public that probably can never be met. In Kearns-Tribune 
Corporation v. Lewis, supra, at 523, this Court addressed that 
very issue when Justice Oaks, in this Court's majority opinion, 
wrote: 
If the media had the burden of proving that an 
open hering would not deny the defendant a fair 
trial, this would either doom their efforts to 
automatic failure (by requiring proof without 
access to evidence) or necessitate cumbersome and 
controversial prehearing discovery of evidence to 
the media, which could well render the issue of 
closure moot before it is heard. 
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Consequently, the Court of Appeals has established a rule that 
this Court has already concluded to represent a method for the 
press that is "doomed" for failure. The only practical 
approach (as well as constitutional approach) is to place the 
burden upon the proponent of closure,8 
Other courts have reached the conclusion that juvenile 
proceedings ought to be presumed open. Associated Press v. 
Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1987) (constitutional 
presumption of openness exists in juvenile proceedings to be 
overcome only on findings of fact supported by evidence); 
Taylor v. Indiana, 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 1149 (1983) (qualified constitutional right of access 
applies to juvenile proceedings); In re Chase, 112 Misc. 2d 
436, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (press and public 
have access right to fact finding trial in juvenile case 
because the "unmistakable force" of United States Supreme Court 
8
 No evidence was ever presented during the hearing. The 
Court of Appeals indicated that the trial court considered "all 
relevant factors" in determining to close the hearing, but those 
factors were only asserted in argument and were never supported by 
evidence (Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 13). There was no 
evidence upon which any finding could be made. There may be good 
reasons for closure, but presentment of those reasons, supported by 
evidence, should be the burden of the proponent of closure. 
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decisions is a strong presumption of open courtrooms); In re 
Roberts, 13 Media L. Rptr. 1427 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Court, July 29, 1986) (Juvenile had failed to show 
sufficient compelling circumstances to rebut Constitutional 
presumption of openness); cf.. Oreqonian Publishing v. Deiz, 289 
Or, 277, 613 P.2d 23 (1980) (juvenile court order barring press 
from juvenile proceeding invalid under Oregon constitutional 
provision that "[n]o court shall be secret"); Ohio Ex. Rel. 
Dispatch Printing Co. v. Petrie, 15 Med. L. Rptr. 2200 (Ohio 
Ct. App., Oct. 25, 1988). 
Other courts have not recognized a presumption of 
openness for juvenile court proceedings. Florida Publishing v. 
Morgan, 253 Ga. 467, 322 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1984) (in juvenile 
proceedings, the public and/or press must be given an 
opportunity to show that the state or juvenile interests in 
closure are not compelling or overriding; any presumption of 
closure is rebuttable); Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. 
Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252 (R.I. 1982) (Richmond Newspapers, 
supra, does not apply to juvenile proceedings; would allow 
access, however, if name of juvenile available from other 
sources); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125 (Vt. 1981) (Vermont statute 
and restricted reading of United States Supreme Court cases, 
-19-
such as Richmond Newspapers, supra, leads court to deny access 
right to juvenile proceedings).9 
The Kearns-Tribune suggests that if the Utah juvenile 
court system (a part of our general overall legal system) is to 
have a rule that is an exception to the general rule in Utah 
for other courts that this Court, not the Court of Appeals, 
should make such an exception. Consequently, a writ of 
certiorari should issue to the Utah Court of Appeals, thereby 
requiring this matter to be heard and resolved by this Court. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The closing of court proceedings should never be taken 
lightly. Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to issue its 
writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the 
decision of that court so that this matter which is so 
important to determining constitutional rights and privileges 
and the general workings of the juvenile court system in Utah 
9
 The Court of Appeals cited Florida Publishing v. 
Morgan, supra. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, supra. 
and In re J.S.. supra, in support of its conclusion that there was 
no constitutional right to an open juvenile proceeding and that the 
burden is on the proponent of openness. That court, however, did 
not cite or distinguish any of the cases finding a presumption of 
openness in juvenile court proceedings even though they were 
provided to that court in briefs and supplemental information. 
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may be resolved by this Court. Furthermore, a decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals which is opposite to the spirit and 
rulings of this Court in analogous and similar proceedings 
should not be left to stand without the review of this Court 
upon which the rule could be either confirmed or rejected. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^-J day of March, 1989. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
D. Miles Hblman 
Michael Patrick O'Brien 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 521-3200 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Kearns-Tribune Corporation appeals the juvenile 
court's order excluding the press from attending a juvenile 
court hearing on a motion to recall jurisdiction. 
Kearns-Tribune asserts that juvenile court proceedings 
should be presumptively open to the press and public, and 
that the juvenile court erred in closing the hearing 
without entering specific findings that closure was 
essential to preserve higher values and narrowly tailoring 
its closure order to serve those values. We affirm. 
N.H.B., a juvenile, was charged in Fifth Circuit Court 
with aggravated kidnapping and attempted homicide. 
A-l 
N.H.B.'s attorney filed a motion to recall jurisdiction to 
the juvenile court, and Kearns-Tribune intervened to oppose 
closure of the recall hearing. The juvenile court allowed 
Kearns-Tribune to intervene and held a hearing on the 
petition to open the recall hearing to the public and 
media. None of the parties presented witness testimony or 
other evidence during the hearing. 
Subsequently, the juvenile court denied the motion to 
open the recall hearing, but stated that announcement of 
the court's decision on the motion to recall would be open 
to the press. Several days later, the court issued a 
memorandum decision which first referred to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-33 (1987), requiring closure of juvenile court 
hearings to the press and public, except where, in the 
discretion of the judge, the media is permitted. The 
decision stated that juvenile court hearings are presumed 
closed and confidential, and juveniles and their families 
have a reasonable expectation that the hearings will be 
closed. The court noted that, generally, juvenile court 
hearings are closed due to their special nature and 
concerns regarding a juvenile's privacy and 
confidentiality. In this particular case, the court found 
no compelling reason why N.H.B. should have any lesser 
right to privacy than other parties in similar matters. 
The memorandum decision also noted that in recall hearings, 
the accused juvenile is presumed to have committed the 
offenses. Thus, abundant testimony regarding the issues 
and the offenses would be presented and bias or prejudice 
might result if those matters were reported prior to 
trial. The court found that the hearing should be closed 
because the very issue before the court was whether the 
minor should remain in the juvenile system and be afforded 
the protections of the juvenile court. Thus, the juvenile 
should be provided those protections in the recall 
hearing. Finally, the court stated that the juvenile and 
his family were entitled to a closed hearing because 
sensitive psychological and mental information would be 
revealed regarding the juvenile. Kearns-Tribune filed this 
appeal contesting the court's closure of the recall hearing. 
I. STANDING 
Preliminarily, we must determine whether 
Kearns-Tribune has standing to challenge the juvenile 
court's closure of the recall hearing. Members of the 
media have standing to appeal orders purporting to restrain 
the media's conduct in cases where the media has been given 
actual notice of the order. KUTV, Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 
513, 517 (Utah 1983). Kearns-Tribune received actual 
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notice of the closure order which denied it access to the 
recall hearing. Under these circumstances/ Kearns-Tribune 
has standing to contest the closure order. 
II. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
We next address Kearns-Tribune*s assertion that under 
the first amendment of the United States Constitution, the 
press and the public have a right of access to juvenile 
court proceedings. Kearns-Tribune claims that juvenile 
court proceedings should be presumptively open and may be 
closed only if the court articulates specific findings 
which demonstrate that closure is essential to preserve 
higher values, that no less restrictive alternatives are 
viable, and that the closure order is narrowly tailored to 
serve those values. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly 
articulated that the press and the public have a right of 
access to criminal trials implicit under the freedom of the 
press provision of the first amendment. Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980); 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 
(1982). In Richmond, the Court traced the long historical 
tradition of public criminal trials preceding adoption of 
the Bill of Rights, and noted the public policy interests 
promoted by that tradition. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 570-71. 
Open trials ensure fairness, and promote public support for 
both the process and its results. X£. at 571-72. Although 
members of the public may not attend criminal trials in 
large numbers, the media acts as the public's surrogate in 
attending such proceedings and reporting to the public, 
thus educating the public. Id. at 573. Further, "[p]ublic 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and 
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with 
benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. 
Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an 
appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect 
for the judicial process." Globe, 457 U.S. at 606 
(footnotes omitted). The first amendment was intended to 
promulgate free discussion of governmental affairs, and 
access to criminal trials helps to "ensure that the 
individual citizen can effectively participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of self-government." 
I£. at 604. 
The first amendment right of public access was 
extended to preliminary hearings in Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II), 
where the Court observed that in determining whether a 
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particular proceeding is presumptively open, the Court 
examines whether the place and process have historically 
been open to the press and public and whether public access 
plays a significant role in the functioning of the 
process. i£l. at 2740-41. 
The right of public and press access is not absolute/ 
however, and may be denied if it is "[s]hown that the 
denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental 
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest." Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07. For those 
proceedings found to be presumptively open, closure cannot 
be ordered "unless specific, on the record findings are 
made demonstrating that •closure is essential to preserve 
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.'" Press-Enterprise II, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 
(quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 
501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I)). 
Although criminal trials and preliminary proceedings 
are presumptively open to the public# the United States 
Supreme Court has not determined whether juvenile court 
proceedings likewise should be presumed open.1 However, 
the Court has noted that historically there have been wide 
differences between procedural rights available for adults 
in the criminal law system and those provided juveniles in 
juvenile court proceedings. In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1, 14, 
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). 
In Kent, the Court stated that 
The Juvenile Court is vested with 
"original and exclusive jurisdiction" of 
the child. This jurisdiction confers 
special rights and immunities. He is, as 
specified by the statute, shielded from 
publicity. He may be confined, but with 
rare exceptions he may not be jailed along 
with adults. He may be detained, but only 
until he is 21 years of age. • . . The 
child is protected against consequences of 
1. In Richmond, the Court observed that while the issue of 
access to civil cases is not before the Court, civil trials have 
historically been open to the public. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581 
n.17. On the other hand, in Justice O1Connorfs concurring 
opinion in Globe, she states that she interprets "neither 
Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any 
implications outside the context of criminal trials." Globe, 
457 U.S. at 611. 
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adult conviction such as loss of civil 
rights, the use of adjudication against 
him in subsequent proceedings, and 
disqualification for public employment. 
The net, therefore, is that 
petitioner—then a boy of 16—was by 
statute entitled to certain procedures and 
benefits as a consequence of his statutory 
right to the "exclusive" jurisdiction of 
the Juvenile Court. 
Kent. 383 U.S. at 556-57 (citations omitted) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). In Gault. the Court held that 
juveniles were entitled to certain basic due process rights, 
but recognized the historical confidentiality of juvenile 
proceedings and the values derived from such confidentiality. 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 24-25. The Court noted that "there is no 
reason why, consistently with due process, a State cannot 
continue if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve 
provision for the confidentiality of records of police contacts 
and court action relating to juveniles." J&. at 25. 
The Court has also stated that juvenile proceedings are 
intended to "fpreserv[e] and promot[e] the welfare of the 
child* which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally 
different from an adult criminal trial." Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (quoting Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
766 (1982) (citation omitted)). Further, the Court has 
recognized that, unlike the historic presumption of openness in 
criminal proceedings, "all 50 states have statutes that provide 
in some way for confidentiality" of juvenile proceedings. 
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979). 
In Daily Mail, the Court concluded that a statute which 
prohibited the truthful publication of the names of juvenile 
offenders without court permission was unconstitutional as a 
prior restraint of speech. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in 
Daily Mail, stated: 
It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice 
system in the United States that virtually 
from its inception at the end of the last 
century its proceedings have been 
conducted outside of the public's full 
gaze and the youths brought before our 
juvenile courts have been shielded from 
publicity. This insistence on 
confidentiality is born of a tender 
concern for the welfare of the child, to 
hide his youthful errors and "'bury them 
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in the graveyard of forgotten past.'" 
• . . Publication of the names of 
juvenile offenders may seriously impair 
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile 
justice system and handicap the youths' 
prospects for adjustment in society. 
i£l. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion also noted that public 
exposure might cause undue embarrassment to the juvenile's 
family and cause the juvenile to lose employment opportunities. 
In addition, publicity would nullify the intent of expungement 
laws by allowing access to the juvenile's record through 
reference to an old newspaper. Publicity may therefore defeat 
the beneficent and rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court 
system. I&. at 108. Therefore, even though the Court has not 
squarely addressed the issue of public access to juvenile court 
proceedings, it has evinced an appreciation for the purposes 
served by closure. 
Several jurisdictions have addressed the constitutionality 
of state statutes establishing a presumption of closure in 
juvenile court proceedings and have concluded that the statutes 
are permissible under the first amendment.2 Florida 
Publishing Co, v. Morgan, 253 Ga. 467, 322 S.E.2d 233 (1984); 
Edward A, Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg. 443 A.2d 1252 
(R.I. 1982); In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 438 A.2d 1125 (1981). 
In Florida Publishing, the court held that, consistent with the 
2. Two jurisdictions have examined statutes which, unlike the 
Utah statute, presume juvenile court proceedings open unless 
closure is requested. In Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 
N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1987), the court interpreted its state statute 
to allow judges discretion to admit certain enumerated parties 
to the juvenile proceeding. Ifl. at 579. The court declined to 
interpret the statute to mean that the judge roust allow all 
enumerated persons access to the hearing and stated that once 
closure is requested, the court must hold a hearing and take 
evidence on the need for closure. Jfl. The court stated that 
the juvenile court must balance the competing interest in the 
confidentiality and anonymity of a juvenile court proceeding 
against the media's rights under the first amendment. I£. at 
578. In addition, the court must consider the juvenile*s right 
to a fair trial under the sixth amendment. I&. The court 
concluded that closure should not occur unless the court makes 
specific supported findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
(footnote continued on p. 10) 
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United States Constitution the state may create a rule that 
juvenile proceedings are presumed closed to the public unless 
the public or press shows that the state's or the juvenile's 
interest in a closed proceeding is not overriding or 
compelling. Florida Publishing, 322 S.E.2d at 238. The court 
stated that, unlike criminal trials, juvenile proceedings have 
been closed to the public, therefore, no historically based 
constitutional presumption of openness applies to juvenile 
proceedings. Jjl. at 237-38. 
In Edward A. Sherman, the court concluded that the 
principle of an open trial serves to protect an adult defendant 
against prosecutorial or judicial abuse, whereas the juvenile's 
interests are best served by anonymity and confidentiality. 
Edward A. Sherman. 443 A.2d at 1258. Thus, the court 
concluded, the Rhode Island shield law, excluding all from 
juvenile proceedings except those with a direct interest, is 
constitutionally permissible. I&. Finally, in In re J.S., the 
court held that a Vermont statute, which permits the attendance 
of the parties, their counsel and witnesses, and other persons 
as the court finds to have a proper interest in the case only, 
does not violate the United States Constitution. In re J.S., 
438 A.2d at 1129. The court found that the compelling interest 
served by the confidentiality shield statute overrides the 
public right of access to juvenile proceedings. !£. 
Utah's statute is similar to the statutes examined in 
Florid? Publishing, Edward At Sherman and in re J»S« under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-33 (1987), the general public is 
excluded from juvenile court hearings, "provided, however, that 
(footnote 2 continued) 
interest. The court then reversed the trial court's closure 
order due to unsupported factual findings, I&. at 580-81. 
In Taylor vf State# 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) certt denied 
459 U.S. 1149, the court affirmed the juvenile court's order 
permitting the media to attend a hearing involving a juvenile 
charged with committing robbery resulting in bodily injury. The 
Indiana statute permitted the juvenile court to determine 
whether the public should be excluded from the proceedings and 
stated that the court shall consider that the best interests of 
the community are generally served by the public's ability to 
obtain information about charges that would be a felony if 
committed by an adult. The court concluded that under the 
express language of the statute, the charged crime fell within 
the class of cases for which access and disclosure are deemed 
generally to serve the best interest of the public. Taylor. 438 
N.E.2d at 280-81. 
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whenever the hearing is had on a written petition charging what 
would be a felony if committed by an adult, persons having a 
legitimate interest in the proceeding, including responsible 
representatives of public information media, may be admitted by 
the judge.- The statute, therefore, absolutely excludes the 
press from most proceedings, but gives the juvenile court judge 
considerable discretion in determining whether the media may 
attend hearings involving acts which would constitute felonies 
in the adult system.3 
We agree with Florida Publishing that the presumption of 
openness applied in criminal trials under the first amendment 
does not extend to juvenile proceedings. The rationale for the 
right of access in criminal trials is not coextensive in the 
juvenile court setting. Unlike criminal trials, juvenile 
proceedings have not been historically open. Daily Mail, 443 
U.S. at 107. Further, public access does not play as 
significant a role in the proper functioning of the juvenile 
justice system as it dbes in the adult system. In contrast to 
adult criminal procedures, juvenile court proceedings do not 
involve criminal convictions, but are regarded as civil 
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-44 (1987). Because 
juvenile proceedings are not intended to punish, public access 
would not serve as a check against unjust conviction and the 
undeserved taint of criminality. Indeed, confidentiality of 
juvenile proceedings is designed to avoid such taint. We do 
acknowledge, however, the potential public good which would 
result from public awareness and understanding of the juvenile 
court system. As with the adult system, such publicity would 
promote public involvement in the governmental processes and 
might deter inappropriate actions on the part of some 
participants. However, that potential benefit must be weighed 
against the asserted state interest in preserving 
confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings. Confidentiality 
furthers society's interest in rehabilitation of youthful 
offenders and their integration as law-abiding adults. Public 
access to juvenile proceedings would detrimentally effect those 
purposes of the juvenile justice system. We find that the state 
has a compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of 
juvenile court proceedings which outweighs the media's right of 
access. Therefore, we hold that a presumption of openness in 
juvenile proceedings is not required under the first amendment 
of the United States Constitution. 
3. Kearns-Tribune has not differentiated the two types of 
proceedings in its arguments, and, therefore, contends that all 
types of juvenile court proceedings should be presumptively open 
to the public. 
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III. UTAH CONSTITUTION 
We next consider Reams-Tribune*s contention that juvenile 
court proceedings must be presumptively open under article 1/ 
section 15 of the Utah Constitution which provides, "[n]o law 
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or 
of the press.- In KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 521 
(Utah 1983), Justice Oaks examined the case law of states with 
similar constitutional provisions and concluded that while 
there was "no support for the argument that [section 15 was] 
intended to create an absolute right that would exalt the 
freedom of the press over every other freedom and interest 
protected in the Constitution/" Utah's constitutional free 
press provision is at least as protective as the first 
amendment of the United States Constitution. As a result, the 
Utah Supreme Court has found that the Utah Constitution 
implicitly provides a public right of access to criminal 
trials. State v. Crowlev, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (December 
22, 1988); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 521 
(Utah 1984). In the context of criminal proceedings, the court 
has "upheld an expansive view of the right to a public trial." 
Crowlev, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. 
In Crowley, the court reversed a defendant's forcible rape 
conviction because of the trial court's closure of the court 
during the testimony of a fifteen-year-old complainant. The 
court found that the closure order violated defendant's right 
to a public trial under article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution in that it was not supported by any evidence or 
findings concerning its necessity. Crowley, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at '25. The court focused on the importance of public trials in 
the criminal justice system to safeguard the accused against a 
miscarriage of justice, keep the prosecution and the judge 
within their proper bounds, and allow an accused to have family 
and friends present when the accused is facing serious criminal 
charges. IdU at 24. 
In further interpreting the freedom of the press provision 
in connection with criminal proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court 
has extended the right of access to preliminary hearings, 
Lewis, 685 P.2d at 521, and to competency hearings for criminal 
defendants. Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 
743 P.2d 1166, 1178 (Utah 1987). in Lewis, three defendants 
were charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual 
assault and aggravated exploitation of prostitution. The 
defense and the prosecution joined in a motion to close the 
preliminary hearing to the public. The trial court ordered the 
hearing closed, stating that the nature of the offense and the 
balancing of the interests of the victim required the hearing 
to be closed. In reversing the trial court's closure order, 
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the Utah Supreme Court examined both the purpose of the 
applicable state constitutional provisions and the purpose of 
preliminary hearings* I&. at 520-21. The court emphasized 
that "[t]he freedoms of speech and press are fundamental to the 
effective exercise of the ultimate political power of the 
people.* jjj. at 521. If people are to be informatively 
involved in the operations of the judicial branch, as part of 
their ultimate sovereign power, they must have access to 
government operations. I£. Further, the court reviewed the 
purposes of preliminary hearings under Utah procedure and found 
that in Utah, unlike other jurisdictions, preliminary hearings 
do not include motions to suppress evidence and, consequently, 
"the added risks of prejudice through pretrial disclosure of 
evidence targeted in a motion to suppress are not present in 
Utah's preliminary hearing." lfl. The court held that because 
a defendant's right to a fair trial prevails over the public's 
right of access, preliminary hearings in criminal cases may be 
closed when access would pose a realistic likelihood of 
prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial. I£. at 
523-24. 
In determining whether a proceeding should be presumptively 
open to the public, Justice Zimmerman, in Bullock, stated that 
existence of the right of access would depend upon "the nature 
and purpose of the proceeding in issue." Bullock, 743 P.2d at 
1177. Accordingly, the court described the nature of the 
competency hearings at issue, and found no compelling reason 
for presumptively closing them. I&. at 1178-79. In both Lewis 
and Bullock, the court noted that the proceedings at issue were 
closely related to anticipated criminal trials, presumed to be 
open the public, and the same arguments for openness applied. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the interplay of 
the juvenile justice system and the freedom of the press 
provision. In fact, all cases dealing with article I, section 
15 have involved the adult criminal system in some manner. In 
order to determine whether article I, section 15 requires 
presumptively open juvenile court proceedings, we will examine 
the nature and purpose of those proceedings. In contrast to 
criminal proceedings, Utah's juvenile court proceedings are 
civil in nature and are not intended to punish. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-44 (1987); State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 <Utah 1975). 
The juvenile courts exist to aid the physical, mental and moral 
welfare of delinquent children and also to protect society 
against mischievous and destructive acts of delinquent 
children. Donald R. v. Whitmer, 30 Utah 2d 206, 515 P.2d 617, 
619 (1973). Further, the stated purposes of Utah's juvenile 
court act are to secure for each child the care, guidance and 
control that will serve his welfare and the best interests of 
the state, to preserve and strengthen family ties, to improve 
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the conditions and home environment responsible for his 
delinquency and, at the same time, to protect the community and 
its citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile 
lawbreaking. Utah Code Ann, § 78-3a-l (1987).4 The juveiu h 
courts have jurisdiction in a wide variety of types of 
proceedings, including, among others, violations of the law by 
juveniles, neglected or dependent children, habitual truancy, 
child custody or guardian matters, termination of parental 
rights, and ungovernable/ runaway children. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-3a-16 and 16.5 (1987). 
U n H k e t h e criminal SyStem, public proceedings have no I 
been traditionally used in the juvenile justice system to 
safeguard the rights of the juvenile. Moreover, public access 
to juvenile court proceedings could severely undermine the 
purposes of the juvenile justice system. Presumptively open 
juvenile courtrooms would allow anyone walking by the courtroom 
to enter and learn intimate details about highly sensitive 
juvenile proceedings. ^ Publicity of juvenile proceedings could 
embarrass family members, weaken family relationships and 
hamper efforts to rehabilitate the juvenile. In re J.S., 438 
A.2d at 1129. In addition, publicity could adversely affect 
the juvenile's chances for adjusting to society, including his 
acceptance by the public and his opportunities for employment. 
Id. 
Although public access is important to iostex informed 
public involvement in government and to enhance public 
confidence in the judicial branch, we find that, in light ot 
the purposes of the juvenile justice system and the probability 
that public access would severely undermine that system, a 
presumptively open proceeding is not mandated by the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, we hold that under article I, section 
15 of the Utah Constitution, the people do not have a 
constitutional right of public access to juvenile court 
proceedings *« m-*h.5 
4, Section 78-3a-l was amended in 1988, but because the section 
is substantive rather than procedural, we apply the version of 
the statute in effect at the time the cause of action arose. 
Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Utah 
1986)). Also# the changes made in the statute do not affect our 
analysis, 
5. Kearns-Tribune also asserts that L "1, section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution, which states M[a]ll courts shall be 
open," provides further support for its position that juvenile 
court proceedings should be presumptively open Article T, 
section 11 provides, "All courts shall be open, and every 
(footnote 5 continued on next page) 
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IV, JUVENILE COURT'S FINDINGS & ORDER 
We next consider whether the trial court properly refused 
to open N.H.B.'s recall hearing to the media. Although we have 
held that a presumption of closure in juvenile court 
proceedings is constitutionally permissible, the presumption is 
not irrebutable, because of the constitutional considerations 
previously discussed. In instances where an open juvenile 
proceeding is sought, an expeditious hearing should be held. 
••The public and/or press must be given an opportunity to show 
that the state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is 
not 'overriding* or 'compelling."1 Florida Publishing Co., 322 
S.E.2d at 238. Following the hearing, the court should issue 
an order with written findings, sufficient to support the order 
and provide meaningful appellate review. Id. 
In the present case, all interested parties received notice 
of the hearing on the motion to open the proceedings and the 
hearing occurred shortly thereafter. None of the parties 
presented evidence at the hearing, but offered oral argument 
and memoranda on the issues involved. 
The court denied the motion to open the hearing based on 
the following findings: 1) section 78-3a-33 requires closure 
of juvenile court hearings, unless the judge determines 
otherwise, and there was no compelling reason in this case to 
give the juvenile a lesser right of privacy; 2) in recall 
hearings a juvenile is presumed to have committed the offenses, 
thus abundant testimony regarding the alleged offenses would be 
presented which could result in bias or prejudice if reported 
prior to a subsequent trial; 3) the very issue before the court 
(footnote 5 continued) 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State • • • any civil cause to which he is a 
party." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that section 11 
"guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that 
is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). In addition, the 
constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was 
intended to confer a remedy by due course of law for injuries to 
person, property or reputation. !£. We reject Kearns-Tribune's 
suggestion that section 11 mandates that all courts should be 
physically open. In addition, Kearns-Tribune has not asserted 
how the guarantee of access to the courthouse for a remedy to 
injury is relevant to arguments relating to freedom of the press. 
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was whether the juvenile should receive the protections of the 
juvenile court system; and 4) the juvenile and his family were 
entitled to a closed proceeding due to the sensitive 
psychological information that would be revealed at the 
hearing 
i'he applicable standard of review is that "the findings of 
the juvenile court are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. If . • . there is evidence to support the trial 
court's action that satisfies the applicable standard of proof, 
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of 
fact.- In re R.W., 717 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah 1986) (citations 
omitted). Kearns-Tribune asserts error in the juvenile court's 
failure to consider evidence in making its decision to close 
the hearing. However, as the proponent of the motion to open 
the proceeding, Kearns-Tribune bore the burden of proof and 
cannot now complain because it failed to offer evidence 
sufficient to persuade the court. It is clear from the record, 
moreover, that the trial court fully considered all relevant 
factors in arriving at its decision to deny the motion. First, 
the juvenile court thoroughly considered the nature of the 
recall hearing in making its determination. In deciding 
whether the juvenile court should request a return of 
jurisdiction, the judge must consider the juvenile's age legal 
record and the seriousness of the charge. Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-3a-25(9) (1987). As in certification hearings, the 
purpose of the recall hearing is not to ascertain whether or 
not the child committed the offense but to determine if the 
best interest of the child or of the public would be served by 
returning jurisdiction to the juvenile court. In re Shreuder, 
649 P.2d 19, 25 (1982). The judge must anticipate the 
possibility of an ultimate adjudication of guilt and revie 
merits of having the proceeding in the adult or juvenile 
systems in that light. I£. at 24. Thus, as the court found, 
the recall hearing may involve revealing highly sensitive 
information about the child's psychological condition and the 
comparative impact upon him of the rehabilitative system of the 
juvenile justice system as opposed to the adult criminal 
justice system. 
Second, the court; factored in the possibility that H.H.B. 
might be tried in the adult criminal justice system and 
therefore information exposed at the motion to recall hearing 
could later infringe upon his right to a fair trial. In 
addition, the court appropriately considered that the precise 
issue before the court was whether the child should be afforded 
the protections of the juvenile coin t system. The courv,<* 
880109-CA 3 
findings amply support the order that the proceedings be closed 
to the media. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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l Miliary ?, |4f}H Appearing for P e t i t i o n e r were U. Miles Holmau nil 
Hi 1 Uiii.'i I ' a r i i rk O'Rrien Al'jn appearing were Walter V hu\ den, Counsel 
for defendant dim r i e d e i i L Jod uiiily • 
The Court had p rev ious ly ordered tha t proceedings in Lliii> mat ter 
sl ioul i l In1 1 In 11I in 1 I I I 1 11L Lo urn t 1 iin hy rnunsel tor I lie 
defendant ana concurrence ui 1 in founty i inu i i t " ' n l m i MM 
pre sen t motion requested the Court 1.0 M V I I S I - t ha t r u l i n g and open 
these pr"!.i-'i-M,l vu&u |JMI:NUUIII ' ' " ou r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y 
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'HIM (Inurt , hrfvliiR iieaLd uuu.1 1 onsidered the arguments of counsel 
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d i s c r e t i o n nt rhi- jurist , ' ' . " media should i>e a l l 1 l h e r e l 1 . , " , I h e 
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presumption is that juvenile court hearings should be closed and 
should remain confidential, and juveniles and their families have a 
reasonable expectation that the hearings will be closed. The special 
nature of juvenile court hearings and the privacy and confidentility 
rights of juveniles and their families justify closing hearings 
generally. In this particular case, there is no compelling reason 
that this juvenile should have any lesser right to privacy in hearings 
before this Court, and his expectation of privacy is as great as 
parties appearing before this Court in other matters. 
2. Evidence regarding the ultimate issues of guilt or innocence 
on the alleged offenses will be presented at this hearing, and in 
fact, it is presumed for purposes of a recall hearing that the accused 
juvenile did commit the offenses alleged. Because of that 
presumption, abundant testimony regarding the offenses and ultimate 
issues will be presented, and significant bias or predjudice may occur 
if those matters are reported prior to arraignment or trial. 
3. The very issue before the Court in this hearing is whether 
this juvenile should remain within the juvenile justice system and be 
afforded the protections of the juvenile court. Until it is 
determined that this juvenile should tried as an adult and treated as 
an adult in all respects, he is entitled to the full protections of 
the juvenile court system, including confidentility of proceedings. 
4. Sensitive matters regarding the psychological and mental 
status of this juvenile will presented in evidence at this hearing, 
B-2 
- 3 -
and t h e j u v e n i l e dou In - i iiin i , n i i il i mill identiality 
regarding those matters, 
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diJ'i^r'ii l i i .I i i in iimuii -men cxu-^-t! a r g u m e n t s a r e p r e s e n t e d a nd 
the decision of the Court is announced. 
Dated this 19th day of January, I'lliR, 
BY THE COURT 
cc. -j# Miles fiolman 
Michael Patrick O'Brien. 
Walter F, Bugden 
Salt Lake County Alininej 
1 
Sharon P. McCully, Judge /;/ ' 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The matter set before the Court this 
morning is a recall hearing, but prior to beginning that 
procedure, I have received a petition for intervention on 
behalf of the Salt Lake Tribune, and we need to hear that 
7 I 
matter first. 
Could I have the attorneys enter appearances, 
please? 
MR. HOLMAN: Your Honor, Miles Holman on behalf 
of the Salt Lake Tribune, and my associate, Michael Bryant, 
is with us also. 
13
 I THE COURT: All right. 
14
 MR. BUGDEN: Walter Bugden appearing for N.B. 
15
 I MR. RYAN: William Ryan, Assistant United States 
Attorney, representing the United States Attorney's Office. 
17
 I THE COURT: All right. 
18
 MR. ODDONE: Rick Oddone, with the Salt Lake 
19
 I County Attorney's Office. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Holman, this is your petition, if you want to 
address it. 
MR. HOLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. What is the 
best way to do this so it will be recorded. 
THE COURT: You'll be recorded. You can sit, that's 
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•-.ne. Or you — y o u LU;. atu-.u 
MR* * .,*«*,. _/c yoj want ^ -i' ::i ny se:?4-
*..^ « these seats , 
MR. HOLMAN i I'd be happy ro S U J I U , 11,11 e v«:" i: - -
""Hr COURT: Whatever—whatever you feel more 
comfortaLie aomq~ 
MR. HOLMAN : Why don 11 yen 7us + ^ •__ 
THE COURT. ,¥!? ' IIHIIH1,1 1 wlni ilnn'* ipeear in 
Juvenile Court, often feel more comfortable, sea:...*. 
I- •• "' -1 inau was my very thinking ; enjoy 
much better--
THE ( ~ i T'O ariead , 
- . - .< netter, ,-r: my feet. 
Your rionot , representor. nil! I 1 l« i :;u:v.-, 
i^'iik^  * •* -r t"r"^ th- viic LdKe Yr *:.'Un-=:, a reportei :_. :<e 
Ttiibu , -- ne oack. * under stand m e r e 
are other media representative^ nere also. 
• pet it 3 r- : 'ite( intervention i: -
matte^ am, • "uen dii_ "losed hearing-
f
 n mc --7 : ; > ' •, .: " t _ j : • wi
 fcw».^—or ~ runs 
! 11 in ii«, I arings. 
23 I This . eu lnter^entioT - ^e're 
not rMcinQ to be mvoivea • : 1 the ur^- - H T S , 
b u L . • 1 ! '.'. hearings opei apologize for the 
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lateness of the written materials that came to you, these 
things always come up very quickly when the press is a part 
of it, and I got it to you as soon as I could. 
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court concluded in a media 
case, it's (inaudible) Eleanor Lewis, Judge Eleanor Lewis, 
that court proceedings should be open. That was, as I 
indicated a preliminary hearing case in a criminal matter. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the press and the 
public had a First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
right to be present in Court proceedings. That's not an 
absolute right, but it is one that needs to be taken account 
of in all proceedings. 
The Court also concluded that in conjunction with 
a First Amendment right, there is also a Utah State Constitutiona 
right to be present in court proceedings, and that one was a 
preliminary hearing. 
In that matter, the Court indicated, though, that it 
may be restricted under several circumstances. They,—first 
of all, there must be—the only grounds for restricting is 
that the fair trial rights of the accused are inhibited. 
Any type of restriction had to be on written findings, 
after evidence was taken, that there was a reasonable likelihood 
that the fair trial rights were violated, no feasible and 
available petition alternative means of maintaining the 
integrity of the—and impartiality of that trial were available, 
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tl "I..if l.He closure ot the hearing woul 1 actually prntert 
*:.»_*.*:*• *- ;oking J. -> m u : i a u , L - ^ , , , : . ; . 
1
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• f>a - r e n e Cour ^ i " _ : n a l u d e d 
' a t *","*' .*r,* . - .(ju ^iH.a-.u v .-.:. _ . ^ 
- ^ o S ^ r \ / ^ h - ^ r e r v a l u e s ; s e c o n d l y , t h e r e m u s t b e 
. w a L a i . L i a * ^ : . - * a i i t r i a l r i g h t s a r e 
r e i u d i c e * : ? , n r d l y f t n u . * a l u e i i .ct txve t o o l o b u i a 1 r s 
.
 :
 * ^.:r*-.h * • e c l o s u r e , i f a n y , i s n a r r o w l y 
-.
 i
— : .-- j i e s t i o n tn*.-u b e c o m e s v 
' i ^ + ^ r ^ , i*a?*.s t a p p l y J - u v e n i i e 
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The cases that have taken a look at this, since 
the Press Enterprises Two case, that's the—kind of the 
terminology that's used to describe that precedent case, 
because there's another one that went up to the Supreme Court 
before it, have recognized that there has been a tradition of 
closing juvenile proceedings, and that every State in the 
Union has procedures whereby, written into their statutes, 
whereby those juvenile proceedings may be closed. But those 
cases have also taken a look at—except for one, and in our 
brief, we've cited the opposing case, too, wherein the matter 
was closed• 
Those cases that they have taken a look at, have 
indicated that the Juvenile Court is not unlike any other 
Court, It is a court of- law, established by the States, and 
that as such, it is a—a court that should remain open 
except for circumstances that are—'that require it to be 
closed. Those circumstances require a showing of reasons, 
such as what the Utah Supreme Court indicated. 
The—even in spite of that tradition of closing 
some cases, courts have concluded that Press Enterprises is 
an applicable case, and that there is a First Amendment 
right for the press to be present. As I indicated before, 
that is not an absolute right, we don't claim an absolute 
right; but there's a burden that must be shown by the party 
asking that the case be closed. 
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-tindment nnb« .. superior tt> tnat statutory 
right, !vi -- .»sure? That —now 
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case. u^ v. , there's a rule of criminal procedure whi." 
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1
 provides for permissive closing of preliminary hearings. And 
2
 when that went to the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
3
 Court concluded that that must take second place, or second 
4
 chair to the First Amendment, which requires certain factors 
5




 In conclusion on this, I believe the authority to 
8
 closing—to close a hearing requires that the Court must make 
^ J findings that a superior governmental interest, which is 
superior to a First Amendment right to be present in Court 
11
 proceedings, must make those findings, first, prior to any 
12
 closure, and without that, the matter should be open. 
13
 I think it's—one thing that I would like to point 
14
 I out to the Court on that is that one of the facts—one of the 
matters that came up in the In Re: Roberts case, was the 
concern of whether or not you should close a hearing where 
17
 there has been extensive publicity already. In this matter, 
*
8
 there has been extensive publicity in it, and I'm pleased to 
19
 indicate to the Court that at least the Salt Lake Tribune 
2° has not published the name of the juvenile accused in this 
21
 matter. And that when there is extensive publicity, any 
22
 benefit of closure is—is extremely diminished, even if there 
23
 is some thought to be some benefit of closure. 
24 J Your Honor, on behalf of the Salt Lake Tribune, we 
do petition for intervention, limited intervention to—to 
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MF *hich way T teeI 
niore sitting, so I'll vascillate—-
v
 alternar.e during the hearing. 
. jo ,— -pviewing *^ ^ ^ 
"dse " Dees, auumittecl s 
-
 :-r<r4-o;i ^ ha* 1 f . *, x - nterested with r;<;w n,^  piess 
-" court 
._jeedina W2tv-Mt a- , . diticuiut .^^i. 
t . - T.--: v.r«,.-v„+-c . i - e x p e c t , bL- m tr, is <^ : * , -r 
case, , u --. iai .ipparently was 
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simultaneously served on you and Mr. Oddone late yesterday 
afternoon that had no case authority whatsoever, and then 
this morning, Mr. Holman gave me a big packet of information 
that I haven't had a chance to review. So, I don't—I'm not 
familiar with any of his case law, and I don't know about the 
timeliness of his request. 
But it seems to me that we start from the general 
proposition that Juvenile Court proceedings are indeed closed 
and that the press is excluded from those proceedings. I 
recognize that in this particular kind of a case, the Court 
has the discretion to permit the press to be in attendance, 
and so it is a discretionary matter; but in the same vein, 
it is not mandatory that the press be permitted to attend 
this hearing. 
Of course, the whole point of today's hearing, 
your Honor, is to ascertain whether or not this young man 
will have the benefit of the Juvenile Court system. That's 
the whole point of today's hearing, and to determine whether 
or not he should be cast out of the benefits and the cloaks 
and the immunities and privileges that the Juvenile Court 
system extends to youths. 
In Ken vs. United States, of course, one of the 
important principles that they point out is that a youth's 
name and photograph are excluded from the media. The media 
doesn't have access to those. 
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22 
j u v e m i e . 
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5
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j guilt or innocence of tnis young man, „.>.»., 
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also be a great deal of testimony that will bear upon the 
maturity of this young man, his age, the sophistication 
involved of this young man and the sophistication of this 
crime. It seems to me that that information, by its very 
nature, is certainly confidential information, should be 
privileged information, and shouldn't make its way onto the 
front page of the local section of the Salt Lake Tribune, 
We already know that Channel 2 has exercised 
absolutely no discretion with regard to protecting the name 
or the photograph of this young man; and notwithstanding the 
fact that Mr. Holman has indicated, and I certainly agree 
that the Tribune—I don't know about the Deseret News, but 
that tne Tribune at least has, thus far, protected the 
anonymity of my client; but it still seems to me, your Honor, 
if we're trying to preserve the ends of justice and if we 
think again about the normal presumption in favor of closed 
proceedings in the Juvenile Court, that this proceeding should 
be no different, particularly where we will be talking about 
guilt and innocence issues, and also very sensitive issues 
about this young man. 
Finally, on the pre-trial publicity issue, surely, 
I think we can all agree that there has been extensive 
pre-trial publicity already, and in the event that this Court 
refuses to grant my motion and the matter is bound over for 
preliminary hearing or for proceedings in the adult court, it 
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seems to me that this is just one more nail in the coffin, 
precluding, or at least impairing the ability of this young 
man to receive a fair trial. I think that the press ought to 
wait until after we've had the hearing, and you've made your 
decision about whether or not he should have the benefits of 
the Juvenile Court. 
I don't think we should pull the rug out from under 
him at the very hearing where that's the issue that we're going 
to decide. 
And then I guess also, one last point, is that I do 
think, with all due respect to the integrity of the witnesses, 
all of them, both defense and State witnesses that will be 
testifying today, I think that the integrity of the proceedings 
will be served and justice will be served, if they don't have 
the news media glaring at them while they testify. I think 
that it's much more likely that you're going to receive honest 
impression and honest testimony from cill of the witnesses, if 
the press isn't here. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Oddone, do you want to respond? 
MR. ODDONE: Mr. Holman doesn't glare very successfully 
so that's not one of the State's concerns. 
Your Honor, there is two elements, I guess that we 
need to address. We're aware that there is significant public 
interest and anger over what's taken place in our community. 
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Our office has received a large number of phone calls from 
citizens who are very interested in what's taking—what's going 
on. And so we're aware that there is an interest, and that the 
press would have a desire to provide that information to the 
reading public. 
We're not insensitive to the fact, though, that 
defense counsel does have some issues concerning the minor 
and the way that the evidence will be developed in terms of 
his case, whether he goes to trial in the adult system, where 
the matter has been filed, or whether the Court brings it 
back into the Juvenile system for adjudication as a delinquent. 
So, we don't resist Mr. Bugden's motion to have the press 
excluded. 
We do not feel that strongly about the matter, and 
we would defer the matter to the discretion of the Court. 
I think counsel is also planting seeds that a broader 
range of evidence is going to be considered, than the State 
would agree with. We're proceeding under a particular statute, 
and that's the recall statute. Counsel has suggested that some 
very sensitive social and psychological factors are going to be 
considered today, and that that would also be published in the 
press and would be counter-productive to the best interests of 
his client. 
Our position was at the last hearing that we had, 
and still is, that the Legislature has set forth the guidelines 
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under the recall statute as to what the Court should, consider 
and what evidence the State should marshall and defense should 
present in order to make their cases; and that's the age of 
the minor, the severity of the offense, and the legal history 
of the minor. 
And we would ask the Court, and we'll argue that 
more thoroughly, I suspect, in a few minutes, to stay within 
the statute and give us a strict interpretation of the law. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ryan, do you have any concern about 
the matter? 
MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, with all due respect, 
before we hear from Mr. Ryan, and with all due respect to 
Mr. Ryan, I don't think that the United States Government 
has any standing to be here. I think that they should be 
excluded from the hearing. 
Of course, you weren't present in the Federal 
Court proceedings, your Honor, but the United States 
Government has now taken the position that they have— 
they've washed their hands of this matter, and they have 
abdicated their prosecutorial authority to the State of 
Utah, and those are the representations that they have made 
repeatedly on the record before Judge Greene. 
Mr. Ryan indicated at the last hearing before 
Judge Greene, where the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
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was—or the petition for that writ was presented to Judge 
Greene, that the United States Government intended to dismiss 
the matter, they've repeated moved the Court to dismiss the 
matter. Judge Greene has been concerned throughout all of the 
proceedings, and notwithstanding they are contrary to Brent 
Ward's representation that Judge Greene changed his position, 
Judge Greene has never changed his position, and he has always 
been concerned about the possibility of an injustice being 
perpetrated upon my client by the United States Government 
lying in wait, allowing the State to proceed where the State 
perhaps has a different burden because of the recall hearing 
versus the criteria that's set forth in 18 U.S.C. 5032T 
Because of that, the United States—that's the only reason 
that the United States Government has ever wanted to dismiss 
the charge against my client. 
And Judge Greene's concern has always been that 
the United States Government should not be permitted to 
dismiss without prejudice, wait and see what happens, for 
example before your Honor, and if I prevail at that recall 
hearing, or if there is an acquittal on one of the charges, 
or any disposition favorable to the defendant, or to the 
juvenile, Judge Greene was always concerned with the manifest 
injustice of permitting the government, the United States 
Government to then refile a prosecution and avoid what would 
otherwise be double jeopardy bar because of the dual sovereignty 
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problem. 
That has always been Judge Greene's position, and in 
response to Judge Greene*s concern in that area, Mr. Ryan, on 
behalf of the government, indicated that they intended to 
defer the prosecution to the State, that they felt that the 
State could surely represent and vindicate the United States 
Government's interest• 
The United States Government is no longer a p^rty 
to this lawsuit, they have nothing to do with the State of 
Utah, or in the interest of this particular juvenile, and they 
shouldn't be here. They just simply shouldn't be here, He 
doesn't have any standing. The government has agreed and 
consented to the State pursuing the prosecution, and the 
order that I imagine that you've had an opportunity to see 
that's—well, I can furnish you wish a copy right now, Judge, 
so at least you can see what the Judge has signed. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BUGDEN: But you'll note, among other things, 
your Honor, Judge Greene specifically refused again to permit 
the United States Government to dismiss the prosecution without 
prejudice, and the Unit—and the Judge, in, Paragraph 7 of the 
order, your Honor, states that the order of the court 
extending the speedy trial date of December 28 is vacated, 
and the Court will entertain a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
the speed trial act, on or after January 21, 1988. In the 
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State—in the Federal Court, a juvenile must be brought to 
trial, if that juvenile is in detention, within 30 days, • and 
so that's the significance of that statutory cite. 
It's very clear that Judge Greene intends to bar 
the Federal Government from prosecuting this young man, and 
that is going to happen, whether the Federal Government likes 
it or not, that is what's going to happen on January 21st, 
And the United States Government simply has no standing, and 
there's, I think something ominous, not about Mr, Ryan, but 
the metaphor, at least of the United States Government, again, 
hovering at this proceeding, is pernicious, they have no 
standing, and they ought to be excluded, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RYAN: Your Honor, may I address that— 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. RYAN: —diatribe. 
MR. ODDONE: Only if you promise not to hover. 
MR. RYAN: Mr. Bugden is correct in saying that the 
United States has a great interest in this prosecution. The 
Federal matter is still pending; however, the United States 
has deferred to the State. 
I represented to Judge Greene that since the 
United States did not have jurisdiction over the kidnapping 
aspect of the case, that it made more sense to have this 
case tried before a Court that had all issues before it. The 
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United States intended to prosecute the defendant as an adult 
for the assault on an F.B.I, agent, and that's the Federal 
jurisdiction; but we have decided to defer to the State and 
therefore, are very, very interested in seeing that this 
individual is prosecuted as an adult. But as far as my 
making any arguments, I don't intend to do anything of that 
kind. I'm here to take notes and to assist Mr. Oddone, but I 
don't intend to represent the United States at any kind of 
argument, or to—to examine or cross-examine any witnesses. 
I'm basically here as a spectator at this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BUGDEN: As a spectator, ne nas no right— 
MR. ODDONE: Well, let me just respond to that, if I 
may, just briefly. In addition to what he has said, to indicate 
that the U.S. Government doesn't have an interest in what's 
taking place, is to ignore the facts that have been published 
about this case, the facts that have been discussed, the facts 
that everybody is well acquainted with, and that is the 
kidnapping, and specifically, the stabbing of an F.B.I, agent. 
The government has a very singificant interest in how the case 
proceeds. 
In addition to that, I've associated Mr. Ryan with me 
during the last several days. He is the person most knowledgeab.' 
about the element of the seriousness of the offense, he is the 
liaison with the F.B.I, and has worked closely with me. We 
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donft anticipate he will be representing any party, but I have 
associated him with me to assist in marshalling the evidence, 
and it is our position that it would be wrong to have him 
forced out of the Court, and it would hamper the Statefs 
presentation of the evidence. 
THE COURT: You all keep raising new issues for us to 
decide• 
Mr. Holman, if you have any follow-up here? 
MR. HOLMAN: Getting back to where it was. I think 
the argument in opposition to keeping the hearings open missed 
the point on two things. 
First of all, the tradition of closing must be, 
must take a second position to the First Amendment rights. 
Yes, Juvenile Court proceedings have been traditionally closed, 
but the First Amendment rights, as that has been involved, 
if we had talked about this ten years ago or even five years 
ago, we wouldn't have had any cases to bring before the Court. 
It is evolving now, and those cases indicate that there is a 
First Amendment right to be there; not an absolute right, but 
one that is—that should be taken into account prior to any 
closure, and that any closure must be supported by findings 
of fact, as I've indicated before. 
Second to that part was whether we agree with it or 
not, and I suspect reasonable minds differ on this, but at 
least the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the 
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press serves a vital function in our judicial process. It's an 
important function* Now, we may have people here who think 
otherwise, but the United States Supreme Court has done—has 
indicated that, and it has supported their decision on 
openness of Court proceedings by that, that is the ground 
foundation for it, that the press does provide a valuable 
service by keeping the workings of government and the judicial 
parts of government very essential to our society, open and 
available for the people to see. 
Your Honor, I submit it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
It has been this Court and particularly this Judge's 
position for some time, that we cooperated as much as possible 
with the press in reporting cases that are before the Juvenile 
Court. 
I think the public does have an interest in the 
juvenile—in Juvenile Court matters, and I have, and will 
continue to endeavor to allow the press to be present and to be 
informed of matters before this Court whenever possible. 
The statute under which we are proceeding certainly 
makes a presumption that Juvenile Court matters will be closed 
to the public and to the press, so we start from that 
presumption. We also have the statute which allows, within 
the discretion of the Juvenile Court Judge, the press to be 
present, if the Judge so indicates. 
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I understand that this particular matter is of great 
interest to the press and to the public? however, I have a real 
concern that, both under the law and certainly in the press, 
this particular juvenile isn't treated differently than other 
juveniles, and I have—I have a pretty serious concern about 
that. 
I know that the press is here because of the—the 
particular victim that is involved in this case, and certainly 
all of the publicity that has preceded the hearing today; but 
this particular juvenile has no fewer rights to privacy and 
confidentiality because he happen s to have chosen a notorious 
victim than—than any other juvenile, as long as he is treated 
as a juvenile. 
So, I—I feel that it's important for him to have 
those same rights. I also think that because of the very 
nature of this proceeding, which is different than any 
proceeding that would ever take place in any adult court, 
that—that the same rules simply don't apply. This isn't like 
a preliminary hearing in a criminal case? in fact, I think we 
almost, as we do in a certification case, start out with almost 
a presumption, well, an assumption that the crime was committed 
and the juvenile committed the crime. And so we're going to 
be talking about ultimate issues here that will ultimately 
have to be decided, either in this Court or by a jury or an 
adult court, regarding guilt or innocence, and I think 
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Mr. Bugden's point on that is well taken. 
I also, without ruling on exactly the nature of the 
evidence that we're going to accept, because I think we're going 
to have to wait and see what is proposed, before I can rule 
to limit, r do anticipate that very personal things about 
this particular juvenile defendant will be discussed in this 
hearing, and as long as he's a juvenile, I believe he deserves 
to be treated as a juvenile, and have the same rights of 
confidentiality as any other juvenile* 
So, I am going to rule that for the evidentiary 
portion of this hearing, the press will not be allowed. 
I—I do have a feeling that the press has every 
right to hear the Court's decision and the reasons for the 
decision in this matter. I am not sure that we're going to 
rule from the bench. I had originally anticipated that we 
would have a ruling immediately after the hearing this 
morning; however, given the very interesting legal matters 
that are continually being raised here, I'm not absolutely 
sure we're going to be able to rule from the bench, although 
that certainly is a possibility. And I believe that for any 
enunciation of the Court's decision, the press certainly 
would be entitled to be present. 
I also am not sure that there couldn't be some other 
compromises, but I—as I try to think of what they could be, 
I can't come up with them. I was originally thinking that we 
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ought to allow them for argument, but not— 
MR. HOLMAN: We have suggested that, and I think both 
of us agree that that might not be objectionable, if the 
Court decides that that's what it wishes to do. 
THE COURT: I think that would give—that would give 
the press a good flavor of what kind of a hearing we're having 
and what went on. 
Mr. Bugden, how do you feel about that? 
MR. BUGDEN: I think I probably don't object to that, 
but depending on the evidence that's received, it becomes a 
difficult problem, because I guess I want to think about it. 
Mr. Oddone and I did discuss that briefly yesterday, but I 
hadn't thought about it carefully. 
And my concern is this: Mr. Oddone kiddingly said 
to me this morning when we were talking about the press being 
in attendance, he said, well, we decided—and again, this was 
just in jest, but we've decided we're only going to—or that 
the press has reported to us that they're only going to report 
the State's side of this hearing, so we no longer object, and 
of course, I— 
MR. ODDONE: I'm a little concerned that we didn't 
get a big enough laugh out of that— 
MR. BUGDEN: Well, the anxiety level at that point 
was high enough that I wet my pants, and then considered what 
he had said; but now, as I think about the closing argument 
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 problem, on the one hand, what I was going to say to you is, 
2
 well, depending on the evidence that's received, there needs 
3
 to be some sort of censure, there needs to be some sort of 
4
 understanding that they won't report certain evidence. But 
5
 then the problem that that creates, is that it does become a 
6 one-sided— 
7
 MR. ODDONE: That's right. 
8
 MR. BUGDEN: —news report, because the evidence that 
9
 J I probably don't want the news media to put on the first page 
of the local section is the very confidential information that 
11
 may well be persuasive to your Honor. 
12
 So, I guess I need to think about it. I don't khow 
13
 J how we balance that, because I do think that what would end 
up happening is that it would be a totally one-sided report 
in the Tribune or the news or whoever it was. So, I don't 
16
 know how to accommodate them. 
17 I'd like—you know, my initial reaction was, that's 
18 okay, but— 
19 MR. ODDONE: Maybe we should reserve judgment until 
20 the Court makes a determination as to what evidence will be 
21 considered. 
22 MR. BUGDEN: There you go. 
23 I THE COURT: I considered the same concern that 
Mr. Bugden has now expressed, and that is that I certainly 
don't want to limit him in making his closing argument to things 
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that he wouldn't want printed in the press. That would certainl 
not facilitate his argument. 
I'm willing to reserve judgment on that matter, but 
I'll leave open the possibility that we would allow the press 
in for closing argument, and certainly, the press will be 
allowed at the decision, at the time that the decision is 
announced. 
And I anticipate, honestly, we're going to have to— 
I'm going to have to make the decision today and announce it 
at some point or other, whether I have some time to do some 
research on these legal issues or not; at some point today, 
we're going to have to make this decision because we're under a 
time constraint as far as continuing the prosecution. 
So, I guess that's where we're at at this point, 
Mr. Holman? 
MR. HOLMAN: Your Honor, if I may just clarify a 
couple of things to preserve, if there is any appeal rights, 
and I don't know that we've chosen to do so at this time, but 
to preserve a few things. 
There—I assume from the Court's order that what 
you're doing is ordering that the petition is granted to 
intervene, to make this motion, anyway, and then this motion 
is denied. Is that— 
THE COURT: That's correct. I—I should have made 
it clear from the beginning, that I certainly thought that you 
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had the right to have your hearing. 
MR. HOLMAN: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. And I 
understand the Court may choose to go on, but I think I need 
to ask this, to preserve whatever appeal rights there are, 
ask the Court to stay the proceeding, pending the potential 
appeal of the matter. 
THE COURT: Well, I knew you were going to ask that. 
MR. BUGDEN: Well, that—that's all right, let's 
just stay, and send all the witnesses Jiome and not worry 
about the ten-day requirement. 
THE COURT: I knew you were going to ask that, and I 
considered the fact that certainly any appeal you might have 
from the Court's ruling would not help you out much if we 
continued the proceeding; however, we're under a constraint 
that the Court has to make this decision within ten days of 
the filing of the Information, which has already passed, but 
I'm proceeding under the assumption that we are within ten 
days of the release from the Federal injunction in this matter, 
And there simply would be no more time to have this hearing 
within that time constraint, if I stay it, so we're going to 
have to proceed. 
MR. ODDONE: Your Honor, just for the record, in its 
remarks concerning the press' interests in the case, the Court 
indicated that this juvenile found himself in a difficult 
position because of the high profile victim that he had 
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selected. 
I hope that's not indicative of the Court's attitude 
toward the case; our position is that he finds himself in this 
position because of the extremely serious offense that he's 
committed, and would be in this position regardless of who 
the victim was. 
THE COURT: My only—my only intent with regard to 
mentioning the victim is that—I'll editorialize just a bit 
here for the press, and that is that there are extremely 
serious matters that are held every single day in Juvenile 
Court. In the last year, I've handled three or four homicide 
cases, numerous attempted homicide cases, numerous aggravated 
sexual offenses, and the press is never very interested in what 
goes on out here, which is fine. 
If you want to—if you want to be here, that's fine, 
too; but all I meant by mentioning the fact that it certainly 
is the victim in this case, I think, that makes this particular 
case more interesting to the press, because it certainly 
isn't unique. And I think it's important that you know that 
this is not particularly unique, in terms of its severity in 
Juvenile Court, and that's why I don't think this juvenile 
should be treated differently than other juveniles who are 
accorded privacy and confidentiality rights in juvenile 
proceedings. 
MR. ODDONE: And there are two victims, your Honor— 
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THE COURT: I know. 
MR. ODDONE: —that we're concerned about. 
THE COURT: Both of whom are fairly notorious. 
But that—that was my only intent in making that 
comment, 
I do intend to proceed with the motion to recall. 
We'll take a five-minute break. The press is welcome to— 
if you want to hover outside, or Ms.—Ms. Gilson will be 
kept aware of the Court's proceedings, and when we intend to 
announce or decision, if—I am willing to accommodate the 
press to the extent that we give you time to get here, if you 
don't want to hover. 
Mr. Yocom, did you want to say something? 
MR. YOCOM: You^ " Honor, yes, David Yocom. Salt Lake 
County Attorney. I—my presence here is two-fold, one is to 
observe the proceedings, of course, and second was to anticipate 
Mr. Bugden's motion to exclude Mr. Ryan from these proceedings, 
and I'm prepared to deputize Mr. Ryan as a Deputy County 
Attorney, special deputy, so his presence will be here on an 
official basis. 
THE COURT: Okay. I am going to allow Mr. Ryan to 
remain present in the proceedings. I do not think the United 
States has any interest in participating in the proceedings 
and would not allow any participation,. 
I—I am not insensitive at all to Mr. Bugden's 
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concerns that he is expressing, but that's not something I can 
rule on, and I think that I will allow Mr. Ryan to be here to 
assist the State, if necessary, but certainly not as a 
participant. 
MR. ODDONE: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll take a five-minutes 
recess. 
(Recess.) 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Brenda Crockett, Deputy Clerk of the Utah State Juvenile Court, 
Second District, Salt Lake County, hereby certify that STATE OF UTAH in the 
interest of N^G.B., a person under eighteen years of age, heard on January 7, 
1988, was electronically recorded by the Utah State Juvenile Court, Second 
District, Salt Lake County, and that the tape upon which the hearing was 
recorded was delivered to the Associated Professional Reporters for the 
purpose of transcription. 
Brenda Crockett 
I, Viki E. Hatton, of the Associated Professional Reporters, do hereby 
certify that I received the above-fnentioned tape and that I caused it to be 
transcribed into typewriting and that a true and correct transcription of 
the hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages 
numbered from 2 to 30, inclusive, and that said pages constitute an 
accurate and conplete transcription of all the testimony adduced at the 
hearing and contained on the tape except where it is indicated that the 
testimony was inaudible, 
WITNESS m HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of February, 1988. 
6/Jj^ &• A/a&t»o 
Viki E. Hatton 
My commission expires: 
June 9, 1990 
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D. Miles Holman (USB #1524) 
Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT ur DALT LAKE COUNTY 
OF THE STATE OF UTA^ i 
In the Matter of: 
NICOLAS G. BYRD, 
a minor. 
KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION, 




Case No. TS^fc^-2? 
Judge Sharon P. McCully 
PETITION 
The Petitioner Kearns-Tribune Corporation, publisher 
of The Salt Lake Tribune, having brought on for hearing its 
Petition for Limited Intervention and its Motion to Open 
Proceedings before the above entitled court, Judge Sharon P. 
McCully, Juvenile Court Judge, presiding, on Thursday, 
January 7, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. with the 
following appearances being made: 
APPENDIX D 
1. D. Miles Holman and Michael P. O'Brien on behalf 
of petitioner; 
2. Walter P. Buyden, Jr., on behalf of Nicolas G. 
Byrd; and 
3. Frederic M. Oddone on behalf of Salt Lake County, 
and after hearing oral argument and being fully apprised in the 
circumstances 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The petition of Kearns-Tribune Corporation to 
intervene for the limited purpose of approving any motion to 
close any proceedings in this matter to press and public should 
be and is hereby granted. 
2. The motion of Kearns-Tribune Corporation to open 
the proceedings to press and public and in particular to open a 
recall proceeding to be held before the court on Thursday, 
January 7, 1988, should be and is hereby denied and the press 
will be excluded from the hearing. 
DATED this /3 day of January, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Sharon P. McCully ^r" 
Juvenile Court Judge P 
D-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the I' day of 
January, 1988, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, to the following parties 
of record: 
Frederic M. Oddone, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
3522 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
F. Walter Bugden, Jr., Esq. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake. City, Utah 841 
1777H 
DMH 
D-3-
